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Abstract—Anonymous web browsing is an emerging hot topic
with many potential applications for privacy and security. How-
ever, research on low latency anonymous communication, such as
web browsing, is quite limited; one reason is the intolerable delay
caused by the current dominant dummy packet padding strategy,
as a result, it is hard to satisfy perfect anonymity and limited
delay at the same time for web browsing. In this paper, we extend
our previous proposal on using prefetched web pages as cover
traffic to obtain perfect anonymity for anonymous web browsing,
we further explore different aspects in this direction. Based
on Shannon’s perfect secrecy theory, we formally established a
mathematical model for the problem, and defined a metric to
measure the cost of achieving perfect anonymity. The experiments
on a real world data set demonstrated that the proposed strategy
can reduce delay more than ten times compared to the dummy
packet padding methods, which confirmed the vast potentials of
the proposed strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to present a novel strategy
to achieve perfect anonymity in web browsing. Anonymous
web browsing is demanded by Internet users for privacy and
security reasons, yet web browsing with perfect anonymity
has rarely been achieved using traditional methods, such as
packet padding. According to the recent ACM survey [1],
anonymous communication systems can often be classified
into two general categories: high-latency systems and low-
latency systems. High-latency anonymity systems are able to
provide strong anonymity, but are typically only applicable
for non-interactive applications that can tolerate delays of
several hours or more, such as the mix networks [2] for email
messages; On the other hand, low-latency anonymity systems
often provide better performance and are intended for real-
time applications, particularly web browsing. The examples
for this category are the Tor system [3], the Crowds system
[4]. Because of the strict time constraint, it poses a great
challenge to achieve perfect anonymity in the low-latency
systems, such as web browsing. The general goal of the attacks
on anonymous communication is to identify pairwise entities
in systems, rather than the content of communication, and
the content is usually encrypted. For example, does user A
communicate with user C? Does user D access web site E?
Data encryption is usually hired to provide security, how-
ever, data encryption for anonymous web browsing is vulner-
able to traffic analysis. In general, every web page is different
from the others. Differences include length of HTML text,
number of web objects, number of packets for each web object
and timing information of packet transportation. Each web site
has its own distinctive feature which is a combination of all
features of its web pages. In this paper we use fingerprint to
represent the uniqueness of a web page. A web site may be
accessed in an encrypted way, such as using SSL, however,
encryption brings limited changes on the fingerprint [5]. As a
result, attackers usually use traffic analysis techniques to break
anonymity in communication [6] [7].
Packet padding techniques are normally employed on top of
data encryption to protect anonymity in web browsing. Perfect
anonymity in communication means that the anonymity cannot
be breached in any situation. According to Shannon’s perfect
secrecy theory [8], perfect anonymity in communication is
possible. Researchers currently deploy packet padding tech-
niques to disguise fingerprints in communication. For example,
hiding fingerprints for traffic sessions [9] [10]; Moreover, in
order to hide timing information of connections, link padding
is employed [11]. Currently, the dominant strategy of packet
padding is using dummy packets as cover traffic. This strategy
results in two major problems for communication: huge delay
and extra bandwidth demand. Because of the strict delay
constraints from web viewers, it is almost impossible to
achieve perfect anonymity in web browsing using the dummy
packet padding strategy.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to address
the aforementioned problem, which is an extension of our
previous work [12]. In our previous work, we have shown
the great potential of obtaining anonymity for web browsing
using prefetched web pages, we explore further in this paper
in various aspects. Our proposal comes from the fact that
users generally access a number of web pages at one web
site according to their own habits or interests. This has been
confirmed by applications of web caching and web page
prefetching technologies [13] [14]. Therefore, we can use the
prefetched data to replace dummy packets for padding. We
propose to disguise the fingerprints of web sites at the server
side by injecting predicted web pages that users are going to
download as cover traffic, rather than using dummy packets as
cover traffic. From a long term viewpoint, this novel strategy
wastes limited bandwidth and causes limited delay.
The contributions of this paper are listed as follows.
• We proposed to use predicted web pages to conduct
packet padding for web browsing, rather than using
dummy packets, which fundamentally addresses the prob-
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lems of extra delay and extra bandwidth demand of the
traditional dummy packet padding methods.
• We established a simple mathematical model based on
the perfect secrecy theory for the proposed strategy and
defined a metric to measure the cost for web browsing
with perfect anonymity.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II
introduces the related work. We present the setting of the
problem in Section III, and followed by the system modelling
and analysis in Section IV. The preliminary performance
evaluations are conducted in Section V. Finally, Section VI
summarizes the paper and discusses future work.
II. RELATED WORK
The HTTP protocol document [15] shows that when a client
submits an HTTP request to an URL, the corresponding server
will deliver the HTML text to the client, and the HTML text
includes the references of the related objects, e.g. images,
flashes. The objects will be downloaded to the client one after
the other. Therefore, each web page has its own fingerprint in
terms of number of web objects, packet arrival time intervals,
and so on. Some web server may encrypt the content of
packets, however, the fingerprint cannot be disguised by the
encryption against traffic analysis.
A number of works have been done in terms of traffic anal-
ysis. Sun et al. tried to identify encrypted network traffic using
the HTTP object number and size. Their investigation shows
it is sufficient to identify a significant fraction of the world
wide web sites quite reliably [5]. Following this direction,
Wright, Monrose and Masson further confirmed that web sites
can be identified with high probability even it is encrypted
channel [16] . Hintz [10] suggested to add noise traffic (also
named as cover traffic in some papers) to users which will
change the fingerprints of the server, and transparent pictures
are employed to add extra fake connections against fingerprint
attacks.
Researchers also explored profiling attacks and proposed
solutions. Timing attacks [17], [18] based on the fact that
low-latency anonymous systems, such as onion routing, do
not introduce any delays or significant changes on the timing
patterns of an anonymous connection. The time intervals of
the arrival packets of HTML text and HTTP objects usually
similar for the target user and the adversary if they access the
same web page, then it is easy for the adversary to figure out
which web site the target user accessed from the list. Coull et
al. evaluated the strength of the anonymization methodology
in terms of preventing the assembly of behavioral profiles,
and concluded that anonymization offers less privacy to web
browsing traffic than what we expected [19] . Liberatore
and Levine used a profiling method to infer the sources
of encrypted HTTP connections [20] . They applied packet
length and direction as attributes, and established a profile
database for individual encrypted network traffic. Based on
these information, they can infer the source of each individual
encrypted network traffic. The match technique based on a
similarity metric (Jaccard’s coefficient) and a supervised learn-
ing technique (the naive Bayesian classifier). Their extensive
experiments showed that the proposed method can identify the
source with the accuracy up to 90%.
Wright, Coull and Monrose recently proposed a traffic
morphing method to protect the anonymity of communi-
cation [21]. They transformed the intended web site (e.g.
www.webmd.com) fingerprint to the fingerprint of another web
site (e.g. www.espn.com). The transformation methods that
they took include packet padding, packet splitting. Optimal
techniques are employed to find the best cover web site (in
terms of minimum cost for transformation) from a list. They
tested their algorithm against the data set offered in Liberatore
and Levine’s work [20], and found that the proposed method
can improve the anonymity of web site accessing and reduce
overhead at the same time. Venkitasubramaniam, He and Tong
[9] noticed the delay caused by adding dummy packets into
communication channels, and proposed transmission schedules
on relay nodes to maximize network throughput given a
desired level of anonymity. Similar to the other works, this
work is also based on the platform of dummy packet padding.
Web caching and prefetching are effective and efficient solu-
tions for web browsing when bandwidth is a constraint. Award,
Khan and Thuraisingham tried to predict user web surfing path
using a hybrid model, which combines Markov model and
Supporting Vector Machine [22]. The fusion of the two models
complements each other’s weakness and worked together well.
Montgomery et al. found that the information of user’s web
browsing path offers important information for a transaction,
and a successful deal usually followed by a number of same
path accessing [23]. Teng, Chang and Chen argued that there
must be an elaborate coordinating between client side caching
and prefetching, and formulated a normalized profit function to
evaluate the profit from caching an object [13]. The proposed
function integrated a number of factors, such as object size,
fetching cost, reference rate, invalidation cost, and invalidation
frequency. Their event-driven simulations showed that the
proposed method performed well.
III. PROBLEM SETTING
Alice accesses web sites via encrypted channels, and an
adversary (Bob) focuses on identifying which web site Alice
chooses from a list of possible web sites. We suppose Bob
has the knowledge of all the web sites on the list. Bob
also captures all the network traffic of Alice’s computer. We
assume there are n possible web sites that Alice accesses,
{w1, w2, . . . , wn}. The a priori of wi(1 ≤ i ≤ n) is denoted
as p(wi)(1 ≤ i ≤ n). For each web site wi(1 ≤ i ≤ n), we
denoted its fingerprint as {p1i , p2i , . . . , pki }. For example, for a
given web site wi, we counted the number of packets for every
web object, and saved them as {x1, x2, . . . , xk}. We unified
this vector and obtained the distribution as {p1i , p2i , . . . , pki },
where pji = xj · (
∑k
m=1 xm)
−1, 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Bob monitored
Alice’s local network, and obtained a number of observations.
τ = {τ1, τ2, τ3, . . .} (1)1582
Based on these observations and the Bayesian theorem, Bob
is able to claim that Alice accesses web site wi with the
following probability.
p(wi | τ) = p(wi) · p(τ | wi)
p(τ)
(2)
where p(wi), p(τ | wi) and p(τ) are known to Bob, because
Bob can actually access the n web sites individually to obtain
these information.
On the other hand, the task for Alice is to decrease p(wi |
τ) to the minimum. As we know that data encryption itself
cannot achieve the goal of anonymity, therefore, Alice has
to further employ anonymization operations, such as packet
padding, link padding to fight against Bob.
According to Shannon’s perfect secrecy theory [8], an ad-
versary cannot break the anonymity if the following equation
holds.
p(wi | τ) = p(wi) (3)
Namely, the observation offers no information to the adver-
sary. However, the cost for perfect anonymity is extremely
expensive by injecting dummy packets according to the perfect
secrecy theory. In order to measure the cost for perfect
anonymity, we made a definition as follows.
Definition. Cost Coefficient of Anonymity. Let function
C(S) represent the cost function for a given network traffic S.
For a given intended network traffic X , we inject a cover traffic
Y to achieve the goal of anonymity, then the cost coefficient
of anonymity is defined as
β =
C(Y | X) + C(X)
C(X)
(4)
This metric will be used to indicate the cost efficiency for
perfect anonymity operations in this paper.
IV. SYSTEM MODELING AND ANALYSIS
In real applications, accessing patterns could be very com-
plex. However, in this paper, we target on presenting the
novelty, effectiveness of our proposed strategy as a new
anonymization method, and demonstrating the great potential
of the proposed strategy. Therefore, we confined our research
space with the following conditions:
• We focused on perfect anonymity of network traffic
sessions and ignored the link padding issue.
• We only discussed the cases on achieving anonymity
by packet padding and excluded the packet splitting
operations.
• We used the number of packets of web page objects as
the fingerprint and focused on this kind of attacks in this
context, and we did not discuss the timing traffic analysis
attacks in this paper.
A typical anonymous web browsing system with data en-
cryption (at the Internet channels) and packet padding (at
the server side) is shown in Figure 1. As a client, Alice
sends a HTTP request to a web server wi via an encrypted
channel. The web server also employes an encrypted channel
Fig. 1. A packet padding system for anonymous web browsing
to return the intended traffic X = {x1, x2, . . . , xk}, where
xi(1 ≤ i ≤ k) represents the number of packets of web
object i. Let ||X|| = ∑ki=1 xi denote the total number of
packets of the intended traffic X . We then extracted the
fingerprint of this session as p = {p1, p2, . . . , pk} where
pi = xi · (||X||)−1, 1 ≤ i ≤ k , and
∑k
i=1 pi = 1.
In order to make it anonymous to adversaries, we created
cover traffic Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yk} at the server side. Let
yi(1 ≤ i ≤ k) denote the number of packets assigned to
cover xi, and let ||Y || =
∑k
i=1 yi. Similar to the intended
traffic X , the fingerprint of Y is q = {q1, q2, . . . , qk}. If
Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zk} represents the mixture of the intended
traffic X and the cover traffic Y , then the fingerprint of Z is
r = {r1, r2, . . . , rk}, and the total number of the mixed traffic
is ||Z||. The adversary’s observation τ is the mixture of Z and
other background traffic on the network.
In previous works, dummy packets are employed to work
as the cover traffic Y ; Once Z arrives at the client side,
the dummy packet Y will be discarded; another solution is
using transparent images as the cover traffic. However, in the
proposed strategy the predicted web data is used as the cover
traffic Y , the client decompose the received traffic, and the
intended traffic X goes to the web browser, and the prefetched
data Y is stored in the cache of the local computer, and Y
may be used by the following requests. In this case, the client
will fetch the expected web data from the cache, rather than
download it again from the server. From a long term viewpoint,
the bandwidth is not wasted and the average extra delay is
limited in the proposed scheme.
In order to achieve perfect anonymity as described by
Shannon [8], the following equation must hold.
r1 = r2 = . . . = rk (5)
Furthermore, the following condition must also hold.
z1 = z2 = . . . = zk (6)
This means that every traffic session is the same. As a result,
Bob cannot obtain any information from his observation.
Let xmax = max{x1, x2, . . . , xk}, then the minimum cover
traffic to achieve perfect anonymity is given as follows.1583

y1 = xmax − x1
y2 = xmax − x2
. . .
yk = xmax − xk
(7)
Let the cost function C(·) be the number of packets, then








Let βd represent the cost coefficient for perfect anonymity







On the other hand, with the proposed strategy, the cover
traffic is part of X in long term. The extra cost for the
proposed mechanism is the part of the cover traffic that the
client prefetches, but never accessed. We define the missing
rate as the ratio of the unhitted prefetched data and the total
prefetched data. Let η(0 ≤ η ≤ 1) be the missing rate in the
local cache, then the cost coefficient of perfect anonymity of
the proposed strategy βp is
βp =
η · ||Y ||+ ||X||
||X|| =
∑k
i=1 η · (xmax − xi)∑k
i=1 xi
+ 1 (10)
Comparing equation (9) and equation (10), we obtained the
following conclusion.
βp ≤ βd (0 ≤ η ≤ 1) (11)
The worst case for the proposed strategy is when η = 1 (all
prefetched data is not used in the future), βp = βd holds. In
other words, our strategy is always not worse than dummy
packet padding approaches.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
In order to confirm the advantages of the proposed strategy,
we conducted two preliminary experiments using a real world
data set [24], which is widely used by the community, such
as in [20] and [21]. The data set includes the tcpdump files
of 2000 web sites from February 10, 2006 to April 28, 2006.
These have been sorted by popularity with all data encrypted.
We took 30 continuous days from the most popular web site
as the data set for the experiments in this paper, and treated
each day as one session. We extracted the fingerprint (number
of TCP packets for each web page object) of every session for
the 30 days.
We first investigated the cost coefficient of perfect
anonymity for the proposed strategy with different missing
rate (namely, different prefetching accuracy). The results are
shown in Figure 2.
We can see that when there is no missing (η = 0), the
cost coefficient of perfect anonymity achieves the minimum,
1, which is the ideal case for users; When the missing
rate is 0.5 (η = 0.5), the mean of the cost coefficient of
Fig. 2. Cost coefficient of perfect anonymity versus sessions with different
missing rate.
Fig. 3. Cost coefficient of perfect anonymity against length of session per
day for the dummy packet padding strategy.
perfect anonymity is around 7.59. Furthermore, the mean of
the cost coefficient of perfect anonymity is 14.35 when all
the prefetched data is missing (η = 1, equal the case of
dummy packet padding strategy). This variation depends on
the fingerprint distribution of the web pages. This preliminary
experiment indicates that the cost for perfect anonymity using
the dummy packet padding strategy is much higher (around 15
times more traffic volume and consequently, a 15 fold increase
in delays) than using the proposed strategy. In other words, our
strategy can reduce the delay up to 15 folds compare with the
dummy packet padding method.
We are also interested in the relationship between the cost
coefficient of perfect anonymity against the length of a session.
We took 4 samples randomly from the data set over the1584
30 days period. We calculated the cost coefficient of perfect
anonymity for the dummy packet padding strategy against the
length of each session (we increased the length of sessions
in the experiment). The results are shown in Figure 3. The
cost coefficient of perfect anonymity of the dummy packet
padding strategy was an increase function against the length of
each session. Every change point indicated there were a bigger
objects in terms of packet number in the past, namely, the
change point depended on the distribution of larger objects. In
other words, the longer the session length is, the higher cost for
the dummy packet padding method in order to achieve perfect
anonymity. However, this is not a problem for the proposed
strategy.
VI. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a novel strategy to achieve perfect
anonymity in web browsing by using prefetched web pages as
cover traffic, rather than using dummy packets as cover traffic.
The proposed strategy makes web browsing with perfect
anonymity much easy to achieve for Internet users, which
is extremely hard to accomplish using the traditional dummy
packet padding strategy. We have established a mathematical
model for the problem based on Shannon’s perfect secrecy
theory, and our analysis showed that the proposed strategy
was always equal to or better than the dummy packet padding
strategy in terms of delay. Furthermore, the preliminary exper-
iments confirmed our theoretical analysis, and demonstrated
that the proposed strategy outperforms the traditional dummy
packet padding method around 15 times in terms of delay and
bandwidth cost.
The goal of this paper is to present a new method for
anonymous web browsing. We have only revealed the huge
advantages of the proposed method in this paper, and there are
plenty of issues in this direction are not explored yet. We are
currently exploring this new area through a wide investigation
on the distribution of web site fingerprints and the theoretical
relationship between fingerprint distribution and the cost for
perfect anonymous web browsing.
In real applications on the Internet, it is extraordinary
expensive to achieve perfect anonymity, therefore, alternative
solutions are desperately expected. We list a few promising
directions to share with our peers.
• Relative anonymization. In some cases, perfect
anonymity may not necessary, as users only expect
some level of anonymity for their web browsing; further,
the adversary may not have the complete observation
on the monitored users, therefore, an adaptive method
may be introduced to further reduce the cost for
anonymization. We believe the Game Theory can paly
a great role in this direction, for example, finding
the boundaries of anonymization cost against a given
anonymity level.
• Packet dropping. It is interesting to investigate optimal
strategies to reduce cost through the strategy of packet
dropping. Moreover, it can change the outlook of finger-
print of a web page or web site against traffic analysis.
• Link padding has to be considered into the framework.
The introduce of link padding will result huge cost, it
poses a great challenge to achieve anonymity for web
browsing.
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